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Article
PATENTING FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER:
EXPLORING THE PATENTABILITY OF
ARTIFICIAL ORGAN SYSTEMS AND
METHODOLOGIES
Jordana R. Goodman*
The conception of Frankenstein’s monster bridges the ever-narrowing
divide between man and machine. Long before Congress codified Section
33(a) of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), Mary Shelley’s vague
description of the monster’s creation has left people wondering: what
defines a human organism? Through an analysis of patent law and
scientific progress in the development of artificial organ systems, this paper
explores the boundaries of patentable subject matter in the United States
and attempts to clarify Congress’s determination that “no patent may issue
on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Though patent
law should incentivize development of artificial human tissues and organs,
Section 33(a) of the AIA stands to limit scientific progress. Either judicial
or legislative action must clarify the term “human organism” to balance the
need for artificial organ development, while hindering unethical scientific
development of artificial humans.
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INTRODUCTION
Every Frankenstein movie, book, comic strip, and television show
demonstrates that, in biotechnology, “just because something can be done
does not mean that it should be done.”1 Scientific progress in the fields of
tissue engineering and organ transplantation have far surpassed Mary
Shelley’s crude description of stitching body parts together to form a
human being.2 Yet, patent law regarding artificial human engineering
remains as unclear as Frankenstein’s definition of “Alive.”3 To truly
promote the science of tissue engineering while avoiding incentivizing
human experimentation, laws regarding the patentability of “human
organisms” must be clarified.
Patentable subject matter should “include anything under the sun that
is made by man.”4 However, the discovery of something that pre-exists in
nature, whether it is an element, law, or principle, cannot be the subject of a
patent without further application.5 These discoveries “are manifestations
of [the] laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”6
1

157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
See MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 32
(Wisehouse Classics 2015) (1831) (“The dissecting room and the slaughter-house furnished many of
my materials; and often did my human nature turn with loathing from my occupation, whilst, still urged
on by an eagerness which perpetually increased, I brought my work near to a conclusion.”).
3
See generally FRANKENSTEIN (Universal Pictures 1931).
4
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952);
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 at 6 (1952)).
5
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110 (2013)
(“groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”
(citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948))).
6
Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130.
2
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Patents relying on subject matter concerning a law of nature can only
be patentable if the claim as a whole amounts to “significantly more” than
the law of nature itself.7 For example, the creation of an artificial equivalent
of an existing, natural product is not a patentable invention.8 Because the
law of nature and embodiments of that law have existed before the artificial
equivalent, the natural embodiment is “prior art,” thus barring the artificial
creation from patent-eligibility.9 However, if a device or material that is
created through the use of scientific or mathematical principles is useful
and novel, with substantial differences from what exists in nature, the
device or material could be patentable.10
This line between patentable subject matter and laws or phenomena of
nature may seem clear, but it has become far too blurry in the world of
biotechnology. With the progress of CRISPR-Cas911, in vitro fertilization12,
and artificial organ creation13, the ability to imitate nature in a laboratory
has become less science fiction and more realistic possibility.
Not only can scientists clone animals14, but scientists can now grow
artificial tissues15, print organs16 and bones17, and even transplant artificial
7

See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (“Instead, the claims at issue
amount to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated
settlement using some unspecified, generic computer.” (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012))); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852)
(requiring “a practical result and benefit not previously attained” (quoting Househill Co. v. Neilson,
Webster’s Pat. Cases 673, 683 (1842) (House of Lords)).
8
See In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (calling a clone
unpatentable because it is a “time-delayed version[] of [a] donor mammal[]” and already exists in
nature); see also Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884); General Electric
Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928); Michael D. Davis, The Patenting of Products
of Nature, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 293, 323–34.
9
See Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2109 (determining that isolated and purified DNA was
not made “with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature” (citing Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. at 310)); In re Roslin Inst., 750 F.3d at 1339. Prior art is evidence that the claimed invention in the
patent application has already existed.
10
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (“[A] process is not unpatentable simply because it
contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.”).
11
See generally Eric S. Lander, The Heroes of CRISPR, 164 CELL 18, 18-22 (2016) (giving a
narrative perspective of the gene-editing invention, CRISPR); CRISPR Timeline, BROAD INSTITUTE,
https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/crispr-timeline
[https://perma.cc/R4ST-KYJ7] (providing a timeline of CRISPR-Cas9 progress).
12
See Bradley J. Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 379 (Jan. 25, 2007);
Timeline: The History of In Vitro Fertilization, PBS: WGBH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
/americanexperience/features/timeline/babies/ [https://perma.cc/GYG9-W5UY] (providing a timeline
history of in vitro fertilization).
13
See Aleem Ahmed Khan, Emerging Technologies for Development of Humanized Bio-artificial
Organs, 6 J. MED. ALLIED SCI. 1 (Jan. 31, 2016) (providing an overview of new techniques to create
artificial organs).
14
See, e.g., X Cindy Tian et al., Cloning Animals by Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer – Biological
Factors, 1 REPROD. BIOL. & ENDOCRINOL. 98 (Nov. 13, 2003) (discussing cloning of mammals); see
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tissue into animals.18 In years to come, scientists may progress from
creating artificial tissues to artificial organs to artificial organ systems.19
These imitations of organs and organ systems are valuable for medical
experimentation,
pharmaceutical
experimentation,
and
organ
transplantation.20 When artificial organs are transplanted into natural
humans, the line between man and patentable subject matter will become
more blurred than ever before. The creation of Frankenstein’s monster, an
artificial man, is coming closer every day.
However, the law is at an impasse. Though in recent years, the
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and Congress have all endeavored to
codify and clarify patent law, their combined actions often leave scientists
and lawyers with more questions than answers.21 Through an exploration of
the American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101, and Section 33(a), this paper
shows where the progress of science is promoted and where it is hindered

also I. Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 NATURE
810 (Feb. 27, 1997) (publishing the results of cloning a sheep).
15
See, e.g., Sean V. Murphy & Anthony Atala, 3D Bioprinting of Tissues and Organs, 32 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 773 (Aug. 2014) (presenting current and future predictions in the field of tissue and
organ engineering).
16
See id.
17
See Leon S. Dimas et al., Tough Composites Inspired by Mineralized Natural Materials:
Computation, 3D Printing, and Testing, 23 ADVANCED FUNCTIONAL MATERIALS 4269 (2013),
(discussing producing a synthetic material with fracture behavior similar to bone).
18
See e.g., Jeremy J. Song et al., Regeneration and Experimental Orthotopic Transplantation of a
Bioengineered Kidney, 19 NATURE MEDICINE 646 (May 2013) (discussing producing and transplanting
a lab-grown kidney into a rat).
19
As of the publication of this paper, scientists have not developed artificial organ systems capable
of human transplantation. However, the field of artificial organ development is progressing in that
direction. See, e.g., Vivien Marx, Tissue Engineering: Organs from the Lab, 522 NATURE 373 (June 18,
2015) (discussing the progress of organ engineering through scaffolds and microchips).
20
See LEONID GRININ & ANTON GRININ, THE CYBERNETIC REVOLUTION AND FORTHCOMING
EPOCH OF SELF-REGULATING SYSTEMS 56 (Uchitel Publishing House 2016); see also Tyler Irving,
‘Person-on-a-chip’ – U of T Engineers Create Lab-grown Heart and Liver Tissue for Drug Testing and
More, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO ENGINEERING (Mar. 7, 2016), http://news.engineering.utoronto.ca
/person-on-a-chip-u-of-t-engineers-create-lab-grown-heart-and-liver-tissue-for-drug-testing-and-more/
[https://perma.cc/QZR4-LDT3] (showing that lab-grown heart and liver tissues can be used for drug
testing and may have future applications in repairing and replacing damaged organs).
21
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013) (“Nor
do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has
been altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no
opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors.”); see also Erin Coe, The Battle for Patent
Law: Federal Circuit Looks to Hold the Line as Supreme Court Eyes IP, LAW360 (July 9, 2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/814461/the-battle-for-patent-law [https://perma.cc/LC7C-7PT4] (“Is a
patent obvious or not? Can [an infringing product] be enjoined or not? Is a patent eligible or not? The
Supreme Court has sown extensive confusion in the law, partly by being unclear and particularly by
being eager to knock down Federal Circuit-created standards as unduly rigid.” (alteration in original)
(quoting former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel)).
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under current patent law.22 The vague determination that claims directed to
human organisms are not patentable only hinders the progress of artificial
organ development.23 Either judicial or legislative action must clarify the
term “human organism” to balance the need for artificial organ
development, while hindering unethical scientific development of artificial
humans.
Section II of this paper discusses the rights of patent owners and how,
though patents convey no positive rights, patents do provide incentives to
research in a particular scientific field. Section III of this paper discusses
the evolution of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and in the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, both in the Supreme Court and under
federal law. Section IV of this paper discusses what is considered “settled”
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as
patentable and unpatentable subject matter. Section V analyzes the current
unsettled patent law of biotechnology, specifically showing that both
scientists and policy makers are striving to incentivize scientific
progression while hindering unethical experimentation with artificial
human creation. Section VI proposes a definition of human organism under
patent law to incentivize creating artificial organs for donation without
simultaneously incentivizing creating artificial humans.
I. WHAT IS A PATENT: THE RIGHTS OF PATENT OWNERS
To understand the implications of determining patentable subject
matter, the definition of a patent and the rights it conveys to its assignee or
owner must be explored. The negative right of exclusion can prevent others
from making, using, selling, or offering to sell a patent. Though patents do
not grant the right to make or use the claimed subject matter, the incentives
of patent ownership discussed herein can be sufficient for scientists to
research artificial creation of human tissues.
A patent is a “special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of
promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”24 It runs contrary to
the general rule discouraging monopolies, allowing the patent owner(s)

22

See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in various sections of 35 U.S.C.); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
23
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 33(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” The law provides no
definition of the term “human organism.”).
24
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945) (referencing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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“the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention throughout the United States.”25
A patent conveys no positive rights.26 A patent owner has no right to
make, use, sell, or offer to sell his or her invention.27 This must be
understood: an inventor who patents an invention may not be able to use
his or her invention.28 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) is not granting the patent owner the right to positively use the
claimed invention in commerce.29 A person can pay for the best patent on
his or her invention and no amount of money will allow them to use the
invention they patented.30 A patentee must be cautious before proceeding to
use his or her invention; parts of the person’s invention, the process of
making parts of the person’s invention, or using that person’s invention in a
particular way might be patented by someone else.31
A patent conveys “a negative right of exclusion.”32 A patent allows the
owner to prevent others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling a
patented invention throughout the duration of the patent term.33 This means

25

35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013) (patent owners may also exclude others from “importing the invention
into the United States, and, if the invention is a process . . . exclude others from using, offering for sale
or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process.”).
26
See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 4-5 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A] patent
gives an inventor the right to exclude. A patent does not give the inventor the positive right to make,
use, or sell the invention.” The text further quotes Judge Rich’s comparison of patents to property rights
in real property. It explains that real property conveys “a right to use that carries with it a logically
subordinate right to exclude. That right to exclude exists to ensure the owner’s full enjoyment of the
right to use.” This right to use is a positive right, whereas a right to exclude others from using is a
negative right.).
27
Id.
28
If a patent only conveys a negative right to exclude, it is possible that using the patented
invention may infringe on the negative right to exclude conveyed previously to another inventor.
29
See Patent Process Overview, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov
/patents-getting-started/patent-process-overview#step1 [https://perma.cc/2E96-38U7] (providing a
beginner’s guide to the patent process, including how the USPTO grants and rejects patent
applications).
30
The United States does not have compulsory licensing in all areas of patents. Compulsory
licensing would either allow someone to produce a product or process without the patent owner’s
permission or create a set price for a patent owner to license the product.
31
If somebody else also possesses a negative right to exclude, that person can prevent a subsequent
patent owner’s ability to produce or use the invention in the subsequent patent.
32
See, e.g., Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 243 F. 883, 890 (7th Cir. 1917)
(explaining that a patent license is only an immunity from suit by the licensor and is not granting the
“right to make, use, and sell” the entirety of the invention).
33
See, e.g., Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F. Supp. 3d 421, 428 n.6 (D. Del. 2014) (“The
core exclusionary right of a patent is the negative right of a ‘patentee’ to ‘exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States.’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013))); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).
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that, when the USPTO grants a patent, the owner can exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention claimed in the
patent. Essentially, in exchange for publicly teaching a person of ordinary
skill in the art how to make and use the invention, the patent owner may
prevent everyone else from using the patented claims for the life, or term,
of the patent.34 Currently, a patent term is 20 years from the time of filing
the patent application.35
Ownership of a patent is different than the freedom to operate – the
freedom to use the patent claim.36 A patent can be used to prevent other
companies from operating because patents convey those negative rights.
Someone who owns a patent can make anyone who wants to make or use a
claim in a patent license that patent from the owner.37 However, a patent
owner may not be able to make and use the contents of their own patent.
That freedom to operate is determined by other patent owners: owners of
patents that may overlap with the patent at issue.38
A person can obtain a patent for any “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement.”39 This improvement can, and often does, include
improvements on currently patented inventions. For example, Person A
patented a table, claiming (1) a horizontal table top and (2) four table legs.
Assume for the sake of argument that Person A invented the table: no table
had ever existed before and, therefore, the invention and patent on the
invention is completely new.40 During the term of Person A’s patent, no one
can make or use the table claimed in Person A’s patent. However, during
this term, Person B invented and patented a table claiming (1) a horizontal
table top (2) four table legs, and (3) a hole in the horizontal table top (for an
umbrella). Person B could obtain a patent on this new invention because
the hole in the horizontal table top is a new and useful improvement.
34

See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013).
See id. (“[S]uch grant [of a patent] shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent
issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United
States . . . .”).
36
See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum, New Rules, Different Risk: The Changing Freedom to Operate
Analysis for Biotechnology, 11 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 139 (2010) (analyzing freedom to operate
agreements in biotechnology).
37
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2013).
38
See What Does “Freedom to Operate” Mean?, PATENT LENS, www.bios.net/daily/pententlens
/2768.html [https://perma.cc/NK6K-2HNQ] (providing a beginner’s guide to freedom to operate
agreements and explaining that a freedom to operate agreement determines “whether a particular action,
such as testing or commercializing a product, can be done without infringing valid intellectual property
rights of others.”).
39
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
40
See Section III for further discussion about novelty in patent law.
35
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However, Person B would not be free to make and use a table with four
legs and a hole in the center of the table top because it would infringe on
Person A’s patent. Person B would have to license Person A’s patent or
wait until Person A’s patent expired to make and use her patented
invention. Person B could also try to “design around” Person A’s patent by
making a table that did not have every element of Person A’s patent claim.
For example, if Person B made a table with three legs instead of four,
Person B would not be subject to pay licensing fees to Person A to make
and use the three-legged table.
When evaluating a patent in the biotechnology space, there is a
“distinction between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which
are tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a series of
acts or steps.”41 Product claims “cover what a device is, not what a device
does.”42 Contrastingly, a process “consists of acts or steps, rather than
tangible things. A process, therefore, has to be carried out or performed.”43
Typically, a claim to a product is more valuable than a claim to a process
because, when determining if a person infringed the patent, product
infringement is easier to prove than process infringement.44 “To infringe a
method claim, a person must have practiced all steps of the claimed
method.”45 Additionally, “the sale of an apparatus capable of performing
the patented method is not a sale of the method. A method claim is directly
infringed only by the entity usurping the patented method.”46
As discussed in further detail below in Section IV, patent incentives in
the field of organ transplant and artificial tissue development are limited.47
Currently, patent owners cannot sue doctors for practicing patented medical

41

See In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (highlighting the difference between
product and process claims).
42
Peter Strand, What’s the Use? Understanding Method vs. Apparatus Use Infringement,
LEXOLOGY (Jun. 28, 2012), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=df5ab67a-9322-44bd-bf2adb71cbb77169 [https://perma.cc/V4LT-Z8M7] (quoting Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1332).
43
See id.
44
See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Method claims are
only infringed when the claimed process is performed, not by the sale of an apparatus that is capable of
infringing use.”); see also Dan L. Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
561 (Summer 2006) (discussing offshore processes and obviousness of a process as barriers to prove
both validity of patents and infringement of those patents).
45
See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Joy Techs., Inc.
v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining that a method claim is infringed when
someone practices the patented method); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).
46
Strand, supra note 42.
47
See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2011) (limiting remedies available to patent owners of surgical
procedure patents by exempting medical practitioners and health care entities from infringement
liability); for further detail, see Section IV(B).
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methods.48 Furthermore, though many patents have been sought and
granted for methods to grow artificial tissues, a product patent for an
artificial tissue would be considered far more valuable.49 To collect
damages for directly infringing a method patent, the petitioner must prove
that all steps of the patented method were performed by a third party, or
substantially performed under a doctrine of equivalents test.50 Producing the
product, such as an artificial tissue, would not necessarily be sufficient
proof to collect damages from a process patent. However, if the patent were
directed to that artificial tissue and not the method of creation, proving
infringement would be far easier.
II. AN EVOLUTION OF 35 U.S.C. § 101: WHAT ARE SECTIONS 101 AND
33(A)?
The object of this section is to discuss the present state of patent law
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Section 33(a). This delves into a brief history of
the America Invents Act and codifying the policy that human organisms are
not patentable. Furthermore, this section demonstrates the power of the
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit to interpret patentable subject matter.
The section concludes by showing the difference between patentability of
method and product claims of biotechnological developments.
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof,” is entitled to a patent, subject to the additional requirements of
Title 35 of the United States Code.51 35 U.S.C. § 101 outlines the
requirements related to patentable subject matter.
Categorizing patentable subject matter has been a hotly contested
issue, with four Supreme Court cases and a legislative overhaul of the
patent system in the past decade alone.52 Patentable subject matter must
48

See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011).
See, e.g., Shields v. Halliburton Co., 493 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. La. 1980), aff’d, 667 F.2d
1232 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that generally, all steps of a method patent must be performed to
infringe. However, if one step is omitted, infringement could be found under the doctrine of
equivalents); PSN Illinois, LLC v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., 525 F.3d 1159, 1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“Under the all-elements rule, ‘an accused product or process is not infringing unless it contains each
limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.’” (citing Freedman Seating Co. v. Am.
Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005))). To prove infringement of a process patent, the
plaintiff must show that a separate entity performed all steps of a patented process. Contrastingly, to
prove infringement of a product patent, the plaintiff only needs to show that every element of a claim
exists in a product created by or sold by the defendant.
50
See id.
51
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
52
See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Services v.
49
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satisfy two conditions under 35 U.S.C. § 101: (1) the claimed invention
“must be directed to one of the four statutory categories, and (2) must not
be wholly directed to subject matter encompassing a judicially recognized
exception.”53 Essentially, any process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter that is not a law of nature, natural phenomena, or
abstract idea has the potential to be patentable.54 Indeed, as recently as
2012, the Court explained that statutory subject matter included “anything
under the sun that is made by man.”55
The Court’s emphasis that subject matter must be made by man to
qualify as patentable has been examined by the courts as far back as 1852
in Le Roy v. Tatham.56 Judicial exceptions, namely laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not patentable subject matter, even if
discovered by man.57 Courts have determined that these exceptions do not
fulfill a statutory category of patentable subject matter.58 Because laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, they are not patentable.
This is not to say that living creatures are not patentable under United
States law. Patents have issued to such subject matter as bacteria59,
genetically engineered animals60, cloning techniques61, and in vitro
fertilization techniques.62 The line between patentable subject matter and a
“law of nature” is blurred in the biotechnology space. This line is

Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
53
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (2015).
54
See id.; see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
55
Mayo Collaborative Services, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
56
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right.”); see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)
(“[m]anifestations of laws of nature” are “part of the storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none.”).
57
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“a new mineral discovered in the earth
or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.”).
58
See id.; see also Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (“‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable’” (citing Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013))).
59
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,465,755 (issued Jun. 18, 2013) (patenting recombinant Salmonella
bacterium).
60
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,113,616 (issued Aug. 25, 2015) (patenting a genetically modified
mouse).
61
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,700,037 (issued Mar. 2, 2004) (patenting a method of preparing a
cloned porcine embryo).
62
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,589,402 (issued May 20, 1986) (patenting a method of in vitro
fertilization).
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continuously clarified and altered both by legislative action and judicial
interpretation.
A. Where the Law Stands Judicially: What is Patentable?
In recent years, both legislative action and judicial interpretation have
imposed additional subject matter limitations through an interpretation of
the four categories in 35 U.S.C § 101. Recently, transitory forms of signal
transmission, contractual agreements between parties, data per se, and,
most notably, a human per se are all outside the four statutory categories of
35 U.S.C. § 101.63 To explore the future of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as applied to
biotechnology and artificial tissue, the cases of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
Mayo Collab. Services v. Prometheus Labs., and Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics must be discussed.64 These cases collectively
show that not only is the Supreme Court capable of judicially interpreting
the four categories of subject matter, but the Court has actively and recently
added to judicial exceptions of both method and product patents.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty expressly rejected the argument that “microorganisms cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress
expressly authorizes such protection.”65 The Chakrabarty Court held that
Ananda Chakrabarty’s human-made genetically modified bacterium was
patentable because it had a “property which is possessed by no naturally
occurring bacteria.”66 Discussing patentable subject matter under § 101, the
Court explained that “discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”67 In other words, discoveries
are not patentable under § 101. The Court reviewed the three basic judicial
exceptions to patentable subject matter under § 101, namely, “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”68 The micro-organism in
question, however, “plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter” because
this is a “non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a
product of human ingenuity.”69 Essentially, Chakrabarty established that
63

MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (2015); see also Digitech Image Tech.,
LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (data per se); In re
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cert. denied) (a contractual agreement); In re Nuijten,
500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (transitory forms of signal transmission); Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (a human per se).
64
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980).
65
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S at 314.
66
Id. at 303.
67
See id. at 309 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
68
Id.
69
Id.
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living matter is patent eligible if it is manmade.70 Not only are some microorganisms patentable under United States law, but also the Court can
determine whether a micro-organism qualifies as patentable subject matter
without Congressional authorization.71
The Mayo v. Prometheus decision controversially limited 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 subject matter in method claims, explaining that the process for
personalized medicine dosing was not eligible for patent protection because
the claims “effectively claim natural law or natural phenomena.”72 The
patent claims relied on “the relationships between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a . . . drug dosage will
prove ineffective or cause harm.”73 The Court found that the steps of
administering drugs, measuring a patient’s metabolite levels, and other
additional steps in the claimed processes were not “sufficient to transform
the nature of the claims” and render them patentable subject matter.74 After
this case explicitly limited 35 U.S.C. § 101 by requiring method claims to
have elements beyond routine and convention to be considered patentable
subject matter, many looked to Congress to resolve technical amendments
through the America Invents Act (“AIA”) and to reverse this limitation.75
As explained below, the AIA did not overturn this ruling and, thus, the
limitation remained.
Though Chakrabarty showed that micro-organisms made by man can
be patented under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the ruling in Association of Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics limited the decision.76 Myriad Genetics
determined the validity of gene patents under United States law,
70

See id. at 310 (“Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His
discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under
§ 101.”).
71
See id. at 314 (“It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must define the limits of
patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken it is ‘the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.’” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803))).
The Court explained that after Congress passed 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Court can construe the language of
Congress and can use legislative history and statutory purpose to interpret ambiguities in the law.
72
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
73
Id. at 1291.
74
Id. (further claiming that the doctor’s step of measuring a patient’s metabolite levels “is not
normally sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such
a law” (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978))).
75
See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012), www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus
/id=22920/; Dennis Crouch, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v.
Prometheus, PATENTLYO (Mar. 26, 2012), patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-thesupreme-courts-blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html.
76
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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specifically looking at isolated DNA sequences.77 These DNA sequences
were used for diagnostic breast cancer examinations.78 The Court held,
much like in Mayo v. Prometheus, that the human intervention necessary to
produce the isolated DNA sequences did not, in itself, render the subject
matter patentable.79 Justice Thomas explained that Myriad’s claims were
not “saved by the fact that isolating DNA from the human genome severs
chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule.”80
The Court simultaneously held that synthetically created gene sequences
that do not exist in nature are patent eligible.81
Frustratingly, the Myriad decision left a wide gray area between
synthetic and natural creation. The Supreme Court justices did not
“consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally
occurring nucleotides” was altered in the DNA.82 Though the Court
determined that naturally occurring, isolated DNA was not patentable and
completely synthetic creations were patentable, the gray area of editing
DNA and, more broadly, changing natural materials, was not explained.
Moreover, the Court did not discuss imitation of naturally occurring
substances through synthetic means, including the field of tissue
engineering.83

77

See Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2111 (“we hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment
is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”).
78
See id. at 2111 (“This case involves patents filed by Myriad after it made one such medical
breakthrough. Myriad discovered the precise location and sequence of what are now known as the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”).
79
See id. at 2110.
80
Id. The ruling in Myriad Genetics seemed to conflate two separate requirements for patent
eligibility, namely 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 102. In addition to the subject matter requirements
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, claims are not patent eligible if they are not novel under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Typically, the novelty of a claim should be examined under 35 U.S.C. § 102, where the court looks to
whether “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public.” However, as was established in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and
affirmed in Myriad Genetics, something classified as a product of nature is not patent eligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101, regardless of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
81
See id. at 2111 (“We also address the patent eligibility of synthetically created DNA known as
complementary DNA (cDNA) . . . cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”) The
Court also explained that, even if the products of isolating and purifying DNA were not patentable, the
“innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes” could
have been patentable as a method patent. Id. at 2119.
82
See id. at 2120 (“Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we
express no opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors.”).
83
See id.
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B. Where the Law Stands Legislatively: What is Patentable?
Legislative actions have also limited patentable subject matter
categories, particularly through codifying policies in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). For more than twenty years, the
USPTO “had an internal policy that human beings at any stage of
development are not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section
101.”84 Though the USPTO had long prevented patenting of human beings,
this policy was only recently codified by the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act Section 33(a) in 2011, which states as follows: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of the law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or
encompassing a human organism.”85
This codification was not meant to alter currently patentable subject
matter under § 101.86 Instead, “Codifying the Weldon amendment [Section
33(a)] simply continues to put the weight of the law behind the USPTO
policy.”87 According to legislative interpretation, this “only affects
patenting human organisms, human embryos, human fetuses, or human
beings.”88 It does not have any “bearing on stem cell research or patenting
genes.”89
Though the Congressional record does provide some clarity as to the
legislative purpose of Section 33(a), namely to render subject matter such
as human embryos and human fetuses unpatentable, it does little to define
the term “human organism.”90 Human organism must have a different and
broader definition than “human” because both embryos and fetuses are not
considered human under current United States law.91 The definitional
ambiguity certainly does not affect beginning-of-life research projects such
as in vitro fertilization and stem-cell research because these research areas

84

157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
86
157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Weldon) (citing a letter from
James Rogan, Undersecretary and Director of the U.S. Patent Office, stating “Given that the scope of
Representative Weldon’s amendment does not alter the USPTO policy on the non-patentability of
human life-forms at any stage of development and is fully consistent with our policy, we support its
enactment.”).
87
157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
88
157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (citing a July 22,
2003 speech in the House of Representatives of Hon. Dave Weldon).
89
Id.
90
157 CONG. REC. E1177-E1180 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011).
91
See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2013) (“‘person’, ‘human being’, ‘child’, and ‘individual’, shall include every
infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage of development.”). Fetuses
and embryos have not been born and, therefore, are not included under the present definition of “human
being.” See below, Section V.
85
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had the guidance of USPTO policy under which to pursue patents.92 The
frustratingly missed clarification lies in the growing field of artificial organ
creation: where does the boundary between human organism and organ
system lie?
III. SETTLED PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER AT THE USPTO
To delve into the gray area of patentability in the biotechnological
space, it is first important to understand definitively patentable subject
matter in the USPTO.93 Specifically when looking at subject matter that
may define a human organism, two fields should be explored: in vitro
fertilization and techniques regarding organ transplants. Combined, these
fields present the closest available analog to the creation of a human
organism in Section 33(a).
A. Creating a Living Creature Through Fertilized Eggs
In vitro fertilization is a process wherein egg and sperm are combined
outside of a body.94 The process was originally developed by Robert G.
Edwards and Dr. Patrick Steptoe as a procedure to treat human infertility.95
Edwards has received a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2010 for
his work.96 This was a major breakthrough in the fertility world, with over
five million children to date being born because of developments in in vitro
fertilization.97 Certainly, patent law should—and does—support this type of
breakthrough in medical technology.98 Still, not everything about in vitro
fertilization is patentable.

92

157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
Specifically referring to current laws and judicial rulings as of February 1, 2017.
94
See generally In Vitro Fertilization (IVF): Overview, MAYO CLINIC, www.mayoclinic.org/testsprocedures/in-vitro-fertilization/home/ovc-20206838 (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) (providing a beginner’s
guide to in vitro fertilization); A.H. DeCherney, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: A Brief
Overview, 59 YALE J. OF BIOL. AND MEDICINE 409 (1986) (providing an advanced overview of in vitro
fertilization).
95
See Martin H. Johnson, Robert Edwards: The Path to IVF, 23 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 23
(2011).
96
2010 Press Release for Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine (Oct. 4, 2010) (on file with Nobel
Media AB). Patrick Steptoe died before he could share in the prize. Walter Sullivan, Dr. Patrick Steptoe
is Dead at 74; Opened Era of ‘Test Tube’ Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1988.
97
See Emma Innes, Five Million Babies Have Now Been Born by IVF – and Half Since 2007, New
Figures Confirm, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 16, 2013, 6:08 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article2462640/Five-million-babies-born-IVF--HALF-2007.html.
98
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Designing
Children: Patents and the Market are not Sufficient Regulation, MSU BIOETHICS (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://msubioethics.com/2014/11/20/designing-children (explaining that Chakrabarty “recognized that
patents may incentivize technology that needs regulation.”).
93
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The black and white aspects of patentability of in vitro fertilization
technology primarily lie in the differences between product and method
claims. To obtain a patent, an inventor must contribute something new to
society, as an invention is only patentable to whoever “invents or discovers
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof.”99 A process, or method claim,
regarding in vitro fertilization would be directed to a method of performing
in vitro fertilization.100 This could include methods of preparing egg and
sperm to be combined, inserting a fertilized egg into a woman, or preparing
the uterus to receive a fertilized egg.101 Contrastingly, a product claim with
regards to in vitro fertilization would be directed to the product of the
method: namely the growing fetus.
Patent claims for methods of in vitro fertilization are allowable under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as patentable subject matter.102 These include patents for
introducing peripheral blood mononuclear cells before transferring an
embryo into a patient’s uterus, a temperature controlling method for use in
in vitro fertilization, and a method of fertilizing germ cells.103 Though these
may rely on a law of nature—namely, that when an egg and sperm meet,
the egg can become fertilized and grow into a fetus—the method’s steps
comprise “significantly more” than that law of nature.104 Scientific
ingenuity and years of experimentation come into play when patenting a
method of in vitro fertilization because, without relying on scientific
techniques that do not readily occur in nature, the woman being implanted
with the fertilized egg would not become pregnant.

99

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,589,402 (issued May 20, 1986) (patenting a method of in vitro
fertilization).
101
See id. (claiming a method of in vitro fertilization inducing ovulation, combining ovum and
spermatozoa, and transferring the conceptus into the uterus).
102
See id.
103
See U.S. Patent No. 8,137,967 (issued Mar. 20, 2012) (claiming a method of in vitro
fertilization of a cell in an ovary called an “oocyte”); U.S. Patent No. 6,694,175 (issued Feb. 17, 2004)
(claiming a method of monitoring the body temperature of a human embryo during in vitro medical
care); U.S. Patent App. No. 13/655,257 (filed Oct. 18, 2012) (claiming a method of in vitro fertilization
for a female patient, including introducing “an effective amount of a composition comprising peripheral
blood mononuclear cells” into the uterus).
104
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014) (explaining that, to determine
whether claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the court must first identify the judicial
exception represented in the claim “and then determine ‘whether the balance of the claim adds
“significantly more.”’ (quoting Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012))).
100
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The product of this method, otherwise known as the fetus, is not
patentable and has never been patentable.105 This seems like a logical result:
a human should not be able to patent another human. Though there are
many reasons behind this eventual result, the two main reasons in patent
law are as follows: 1) the product already exists in nature and 2) it would
be unethical to allow a human to patent another human, and current United
States patent policy reflects this unethical result.106
The first reason that fetuses are not patentable is that the product, the
fetus, already exists in nature.107 Outside of the subject matter eligibility
requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a person cannot get a patent on
something that is not new or novel.108 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, if a product
or process already exists in nature, it cannot later be patented.109 As
previously discussed in Section III(A), naturally occurring human genes,
even those isolated from the human body, are not patentable because they
are naturally occurring.110 For the same reason, a fetus would not be
patentable. Even if the fetus in question has a combination of genes that
would not exist but for the method applied, the method being in vitro

105

157 Cong. Rec. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (explaining the
United States Patent and Trademark Office “has not issued patents on claims directed to human
organisms, including human embryos and fetuses.”).
106
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on
sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”); see
also DRJ Macer, Patent or Perish? An Ethical Approach to Patenting Human Genes and Proteins, 2
THE PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 361 (2002) (describing ethical dilemmas with human patenting, including
incentivizing unethical research, harming human moral order including the environment, Article 4 of
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, and government price controls).
107
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (explaining that “handiwork of nature”
is not patentable subject matter, but a product with “markedly different characteristics from any found
in nature” is patentable subject matter).
108
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015) (explaining that a condition for patentability is that the claimed
invention was not in public use or “otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention”) (emphasis added). Though the Court has recognized that “the § 102 novelty
inquiry” may sometimes overlap the “§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry,” this paper is directed to patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1304 (2012). For a more in-depth analysis of the Court’s conflation of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 102, see
Teige P. Sheehan, Mayo v. Prometheus: The Overlap Between Patent Eligibility and Patentability, 21
BRIGHT IDEAS: N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 1 (Fall 2012).
109
See id.; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189-190 (1981) (explaining that 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 “covers in detail the conditions relating to novelty,” and it could be “an amplification and
definition of ‘new’ in section 101”); In re Bergstrom 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
110
See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014) (explaining that the Supreme
Court has “long held that [35 U.S.C. § 101] contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable” (quoting Association for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013))).
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fertilization, the result of that method cannot be patented in the wake of
Prometheus and Myriad Genetics.111
Additional support for not allowing products of in vitro fertilization to
be patented can be found in In re Roslin Institute.112 In this case, the Federal
Circuit determined that cloned animals were unpatentable subject matter.113
Though genetically modified animals can be patented under United States
patent law, a clone of an animal cannot be patented.114 As acknowledged in
In re Roslin Institute, “naturally occurring organisms are not patentable.”115
Though there are methods relating to selecting materials to be combined
which will eventually form a living being, “the natural organism itself [is]
unpatentable because its ‘qualities are the work of nature’ unaltered by the
hand of man.”116
A fetus, likewise, is a product “unaltered by the hand of man.”117
Because the fertilized egg has not been modified, with the exception of a
natural fertilization process, the product of that fertilization is no different
than any other fetus or human existing in society.118 The discovery does not
possess “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature.”119
Therefore, the subject matter is unpatentable.
The second reason that a fetus is unpatentable is spelled out in United
States policy and law. Specifically Section 33(a) and, before that, general
USPTO policy did not allow for the patentability of human embryos or
fetuses.120 Though the definition of human organism is not specifically laid
out in United States law, it is safe to say that fetuses and humans certainly

111

Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2120; Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
In re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
113
See id. at 1339 (stating that “a time-delayed version of a donor mammal,” otherwise known as a
clone, simply has a “time-delayed characteristic” of the donor mammal, rather than a different
characteristic of the mammal. Therefore, the clones “are unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”).
114
Id. at 1336 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)).
115
Id.
116
Id. (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130).
117
Id.
118
But see Section V (discussing genetic modification and artificial tissues). The above scenario
assumes that the in vitro fertilization did not also include genetically modifying the spermatozoan
(sperm), ovum (egg), or zygote (fertilized egg).
119
Id. (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310).
120
157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (stating that the
Section 33(a) amendment “provides congressional support for the current U.S. Patent and Trademark
policy against patenting human organisms, including human embryos and fetuses.”).
112
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fall within the category.121 Therefore, the patent office has always had a
policy to categorically deny patents directed to human fetuses or humans.122
B. Medical Techniques in Organ Transplants
Though the American Medical Association “vigorously condemn[s]
the patenting of medical and surgical procedures,” their campaign to amend
35 U.S.C. § 101 over the past two decades has been largely unsuccessful.123
Unlike other countries, the United States allows for inventors to patent
medical methodologies and surgical procedures.124 However, patents of
medical methodologies and surgical procedures are not as valuable as other
method patents.125 35 U.S.C. § 287 limits remedies available to patent
owners of surgical procedure patents.126 35 U.S.C. § 287 reads, in relevant
part, as follows:
121

See id.; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2105 (2015).
See id.; 157 CONG. REC. E1180 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (remarks of Rep. Smith) (Explaining
that the Weldon Amendment “should not be construed to affect claims directed to or encompassing
subject matter other than human organisms, including but not limited to claims directed to or
encompassing the following: cells, tissues, organs, or other bodily components that are not themselves
human organisms (including, but not limited to, stem cells, stem cell lines, genes, and living or
synthetic organs); hormones, proteins or other substances produced by human organisms; methods for
creating, modifying, or treating human organisms, including but not limited to methods for creating
human embryos through in vitro fertilization, somatic cell nuclear transfer, or parthenogensis; drugs or
devices (including prosthetic devices) which may be used in or on human organisms.” The Weldon
amendment should be construed as Congressional approval “for the long-standing USPTO policy of
refusing to grant any patent containing a claim that encompasses any member of the species homo
sapiens at any stage of development” (quoting James Rogan (Nov. 20, 2003) (emphasis added))).
123
See Robert Gunderman & John Hammond, The Limited Monopoly: “Under the Knife”—
Patenting Surgical Procedures, 10 ROCHESTER ENGINEER 1 (Feb. 2009) (citing American Medical
Association, Resolutions, PROC. AM. MED. ASS’N ANNUAL MEETING 390 (1994), www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-history/ama-historical-archives/the-digital-collection-historical-amadocuments.page).
124
See, e.g., Ex Parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107, 110 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954) (overruling the
examiner’s decision that a medical method claim of injecting fluid into the human body is not
patentable because “the only useful result . . . is dependent on the reaction of the human body to the
injected fluid.” The court stated that the “utility of the injection of medicaments as a mode of
administering medicaments cannot be denied. Consequently, the method . . . must be considered as
useful within the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 101.”); U.S. Patent No. 5,080,111 (issued Jan. 14, 1992)
(patenting a method of making a surgical incision).
125
See David B. Gornish, Medical Method Patents, LAW 360 (Sept. 7, 2006, 12:00 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/9766/medical-method-patents
[https://perma.cc/H2CF-G8UQ]
(explaining that useful processes and methods can be patentable. Though “the United States is one of
the only countries which considers medical methods to be patentable subject matter,” 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c) limits medical method patents. § 287(c) “exempts licensed medical professionals (e.g. doctors)
and related healthcare entities (e.g. hospitals) from liability for infringement of medical method
patents.”).
126
See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011) (explaining that if a medical practitioner infringes a patent, the
patent owner cannot collect an infringement remedy from the medical practitioner or the health care
entity, such as a hospital, with respect to the medical activity performed by the medical practitioner);
122
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(c) With respect to a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical activity
that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the medical
practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical
activity . . . (c)(3) This subsection does not apply to the activities of any
person, or employee or agent of such a person . . . who is engaged in the
commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy
or clinical laboratory services . . . where such activities are: (A) directly
related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or
distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the
provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services. . . .127

Under 35 U.S.C. § 287, a patentee cannot collect infringement
remedies, including civil trial, injunction, damages, and attorney’s fees, as
a result of a medical practitioner “infringing” the patented medical
activity.128 In other words, if a doctor performs the patented procedure, the
patent owner cannot sue for damages.
However, this does not revoke the patentability of the medical
procedures under 35 U.S.C. § 101.129 Though a patent owner of a medical
procedure patent certainly cannot collect damages from a medical
professional, the owner can collect damages in an industrial setting.130 In
business, research “that is in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate
business, regardless of commercial implications,” is susceptible to patent
see also Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 16 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 299, 306-310 (Winter 2008) (providing a legislative history summary of 35 U.S.C. § 287).
127
35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010) (direct infringement); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b) (2010) (infringement by active inducement); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1952) (remedy for infringement
of a patent); 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1952) (injunction); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (damages); 35 U.S.C. § 285
(1952) (attorney fees). This only exempts 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and (b), meaning that a patent owner can
collect from medical practitioners or heath care providers under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c) for matters related
to contributory infringement.
128
See id.; see also Gornish, supra note 125 (explaining that a surgeon who performs an infringing
surgery “would be insulated from infringement liability under § 287(c).” Patented medical methods
where “the only persons or entities that are likely to directly infringe a patented medical method cannot
be held liable for infringement . . . [are] essentially worthless.”).
129
See Gornish, supra note 125 (“[T]here are two phases of the patent process: (1) procurement
and (2) enforcement. Procurement (i.e., patent prosecution) involves applying for and obtaining a patent
from the government. Enforcement is how the patent holder uses an issued patent to exclude others
from practicing the patented invention, and/or obtain damages for infringement.” 35 U.S.C. § 287 limits
enforcement, not procurement, of a patent.).
130
See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2011) (protecting only “a medical practitioner’s performance of a medical
activity” and not a person “engaged in the “commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or
distribution of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . where such activities are . . .
directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory
services.”).
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infringement suit.131 Therefore, if infringing medical procedures are used in
business rather than in medical practice, the patent owner could sue the
infringer for damages.
The exploration of and monetary incentives behind organ transplant
extend far beyond medical procedures. Though the field of organ transplant
originated with medical procedures, the field has now become intertwined
with artificial tissue development.132 As discussed in more detail below,
artificial tissues can be used as replacements for natural tissues.133 As a
replacement, artificial tissues could be transplanted into a human as a
substitute for an organ or tissue donation.134 However, because these
tissues, unlike natural tissues, could be commoditized and produced in
industry, industrial facilities would be practicing the methods of
transplanting tissues. Therefore, methodologies related to organ transplant
not only remain patentable under United States law, but are also rapidly
becoming valuable patents.
IV.UNSETTLED PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER: THE GREY LINE OF
ARTIFICIAL HUMAN ORGANISMS
This section looks to dissect the struggle of differentiating between
artificial creation of a human organism and progressive scientific
experimentation in creating human tissues. As the creation of artificial
human organs bridges the gap between science fiction and fact, scientists,
legislators, and ethicists are working to simultaneously incentivize
scientific progress and discourage unethical experimentation. Their
intentions can be united through defining the term “human organism” in
Section 33(a) to effectively discourage unethical experimentation.
A. A Scientist’s Perspective: Defining the “Progress of Science” Through
Researchers and Ethicists
To better define the difference between ethical experimentation and
monstrous unethical research, look to the scientists. The consequences of
incentivizing the creation of an artificial human are recognized far outside
of the legal space. The scientific community as a whole regularly works to

131

Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Tissue Engineering, 18 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY IT56, IT56-IT58 (2000) (discussing the
history and future of the tissue engineering industry).
133
See, e.g., Alessandro Gonfiotti, et al., The first tissue-engineered airway transplantation: 5-year
follow-up results, 383 THE LANCET 238, 238–44 (2014) (discussing the progress of the tissueengineered, artificially created trachea after the first transplantation in 2009).
134
See id. (showing that the trachea could be grown in a laboratory and inserted into a person. This
process is in lieu of using the tissue or organs of an organ donor).
132
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de-incentivize pursuits that are ethically questionable at best. Unethical and
socially unacceptable scientific studies regarding human experimentation
are often heavily criticized before publication, may be denied publication
from top journals, and may lose grant funding.135 Though, like patents, this
cannot stop a scientist from finding his or her own funding and engaging in
privatized experiments, removing incentives reduces the impact of those
studies before science and the law have come to a consensus concerning
procedure after such a study is successful.136 Patent law should work in
parallel with ethicists and scientists to collectively incentivize innovation
while discouraging unethical artificial human experimentation.
Research scientists often rely on government grants, private grants,
and funding from foundations to fund their research.137 With federal grants
dwindling with recent budgetary cuts, the competition to receive grants has
only become stiffer.138 The culture of the academic scientific world is based
on a “publish or perish” philosophy.139 The amount of publications and,
more importantly, the prestige these publications afford the scientists,
correlates both to the amount of funding the scientist’s laboratory may
receive and the career success of that scientist.140
Like legal or medical journals, scientific journals have a known
ranking system. Journals that have a high-impact, meaning that the articles
published in those journals are cited more frequently in a three year time
135

See Karen Young Kreeger, Reproduction Research Held Back by Diffuse Rules, Charged
Politics THE SCIENTIST (1997), available at http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo
/18343/title/Reproduction-Research-Held-Back-By-Diffuse-Rules--Charged-Politics/ [https://perma.cc
/86BP-QGYM] (explaining that Mark Hughes, a professor at Georgetown University, “used agency
funds, in part, to conduct genetic tests on DNA derived from human embryos destined for in vitro
fertilization” and, as a result, lost his funding).
136
See id.
137
See Paula E. Stephan, The Economics of Science, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1199, 1225 (Sept. 1996)
(“U.S. Scientists are responsible for raising their own funds through the submissions of proposals to
funding agencies.”).
138
See Art Jahnke, Who Picks Up the Tab for Science?, BOSTON U. (2015) http://www.bu.edu
/research/articles/funding-for-scientific-research/ [https://perma.cc/HWY2-ANHX] (“[s]ince the 2010
apex, cuts to discretionary spending have clipped R&D funds by 15.4 percent in inflation-adjusted
spending”); Bob Grant, Follow the Funding, THE SCIENTIST (May 2015), http://www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/42799/title/Follow-the-Funding/ [https://perma.cc/8V7N-E4WU]
(showing that laboratories unable to fund salaries and experiments with dwindling National Institutes of
Health funding).
139
See Danielle Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical Support
from US States Data, PLOS (2010), http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0010271 [https://perma.cc
/WEG5-T768] (explaining that “The growing competition and ‘publish or perish’ culture in academia
might conflict with the objectivity and integrity of research, because it forces scientists to produce
‘publishable’ results at all costs.”).
140
See id. (explaining “bibliometric parameters to evaluate careers (e.g. number of publications
and the impact factor of the journals they appeared in)” are integral to a scientist’s career in academia).
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period, are considered more prestigious.141 For example, Nature Reviews
Molecular Cell Biology has an impact factor of 32.928 for 2015, meaning
that each article published since 2012 in the journal was cited, on average,
32.928 times at the end of the 2015 year.142 Comparatively, a lower-impact
journal, such as Trends in Biochemical Sciences had an impact factor of
10.183 in 2015.143
The higher the impact of a paper often correlates with the prestige of
the study.144 This, however, often leads to a cyclical turn of events. The
more attention a paper gains in the scientific world, the better.145 Therefore,
scientists want to publish in a journal that has a high impact factor, because
that increases the likelihood of a particular paper being a high impact
paper. In turn, more scientists read and reference studies in high impact
journals because they are considered more prestigious.146 Though many
have published articles explaining that the impact factor of a journal may
not be the most accurate way to measure the value or import of the article,
the impact factor is nevertheless one of the most emphasized components
when choosing a publication journal.147
To discourage unethical scientific experiments and, thus, both
decrease the likelihood of independent funding for experiments and the
readership for results of unethical experiments, high impact journals will
refuse to publish unethical scientific pursuits regardless of overall scientific
value.148 Journal editors recognize that article selection encourages

141

See id. (showing that the impact factor is an important aspect when evaluating the prestige of a
publication).
142
Scimago Journal & Country Rank, SCIMAGO LAB (2016), http://www.scimagojr.com
/journalrank.php?category=1312 [https://perma.cc/5R45-HHDX].
143
Id.
144
See Kamil Mizera, The Big IF: Is Journal Impact Factor Really So Important?, OPEN SCIENCE
(June 7, 2013) (“Despite many negative voices and evidence, the impact factor is still doing well and is
one of the most influential criteria when establishing the prestige and career of a scientist.”).
145
See id. (showing that paper authors care about having the most citations from their respective
publications and, therefore, are still publishing at high impact factor journals).
146
See id. (showing that despite Open Access publications having a wide audience, scholars
“usually prefer to publish (or try to publish) in the traditional way, in journals with Impact Factors.”).
147
Id.
148
David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos,
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modifyhuman-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/7NJM-DZA4] (showing that the high impact journals,
Nature and Science refused to publish a paper about modifying human embryos. Though the research
may have been properly vetted, the ethical concerns associated with experimenting on the human
embryo became an overwhelming factor in denying the lead scientists a publication.” Huang says that
the paper [about modifying human embryos] was rejected by Nature and Science, in part because of
ethical objections.”).
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scientists to pursue further paths of research related to a publication.149
Without high impact publications, progress will become slower and,
perhaps, the field of inquiry will die altogether. With regards to the
development of an artificial human, high impact journals such as Science,
Cell, and Nature are refusing to publish certain experimental results,
demonstrating that the scientific community recognizes that questionablyethical experiments regarding the creation of artificial humans are no
longer simply science fiction.150 By rejecting articles for publication
regarding gene-editing and head transplantation, as discussed below,
scientists are showing that there are limits to what should be encouraged
for the purposes of the “Progress of Science.”151
Recently, scientists have discovered a breakthrough system for gene
editing known as “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic
repeats” or “CRISPR” for short.152 Gene editing techniques can be used for
everything from medicine to crop seed enhancement to germline editing.153
Overall, the CRISPR-Cas9 system enables scientists to remove, add, or
alter sections of a DNA sequence faster, cheaper, and more accurately than
previous DNA editing techniques.154 Changing a section of DNA allows
scientists to study the function of that section of DNA, which can be useful
for learning about almost anything involving how a cell works, whether
that be a plant cell, animal cell, bacterial cell, or fungal cell.155 However,
with almost every scientific discovery regarding life, it is possible for
research to take a dangerous and unethical turn.

149

See id.; see also Daniel Cressey & David Cyranoski, Human-embryo Editing Poses Challenges
for Journals, NATURE NEWS (Apr. 28, 2015), www.nature.com/news/human-embryo-editing-poseschallenges-for-journals-1.17429 [https://perma.cc/N4BJ-ME4H] (explaining that there are “complex
ethical concerns and potential societal impacts” associated with studies on the human germline (quoting
Emilie Marcus, editor-in-chief of Cell)).
150
See Cressy, supra note 149 (explaining that gene-editing of human embryos is complicated and
that journals, such as Cell, require “high technical and ethical standards” to publish); see also Journal
Info, (2016) www.bioxbio.com/if/html/NATURE.html [https://perma.cc/PZ66-L3A9] (Nature 2015
impact factor: 38.138; Science 2015 impact factor: 34.661; Cell 2015 impact factor: 28.710).
151
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
152
See, e.g., What is CRISPR-Cas9?, GENOME CAMPUS (Dec. 19, 2016), www.yourgenome.org
/facts/what-is-crispr-cas9 (providing a beginner’s guide to CRISPR); Alex Reis, et al., CRISPR/Cas9
and Targeted Genome Editing: A New Era in Molecular Biology, 1 NEB EXPRESSIONS (2014),
https://www.neb.com/tools-and-resources/feature-articles/crispr-cas9-and-targeted-genome-editing-anew-era-in-molecular-biology [https://perma.cc/4U9V-LG3G] (providing a more advanced guide to
CRISPR).
153
See id.
154
See id.
155
See What is CRISPR-Cas9?, supra note 152 (looking at the applications and implications of
CRISPR-Cas9).
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Though the CRISPR-Cas9 system is useful in many contexts, the use
of the system to edit human reproductive (germline) cells has become a
cause for concern in the scientific community.156 Scientists have been using
CRISPR-Cas9 to edit non-reproductive (somatic) cells for over a decade.157
However, the ability to edit human germline cells, otherwise known as egg
and sperm cells, grants scientists the ability to essentially create genetically
modified humans.158
Germline modifications are different than somatic modifications
because germline modifications are heritable.159 This means that, if the
germline modification results in a viable human that can reproduce, that
human can pass on the germline modification to offspring.160 As of now,
scientists cannot predict what effect this will have on future generations.161
Encouraging research on germline modification could result in “unsafe or
unethical uses of the technique,” including changing skin color,
intelligence, or athletic ability.162
The scientific outcry with regards for discouraging human germline
editing occurs on two main levels, the individual level and the community
level. Many scientists have called for a voluntary moratorium to
“discourage human germline modification and raise public awareness of
the difference between [genome editing in somatic cells and in germ
cells].”163 Essentially, each scientist would voluntarily stop researching
CRISPR-Cas9 applications on germline cells.164 Though this may work on a
small-scale basis, individual moratoriums are not going to stop scientific

156

See Edward Lanphier, et al., Don’t Edit the Human Germ Line, NATURE (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.nature.com/news/don-t-edit-the-human-germ-line-1.17111 [https://perma.cc/SXQ6-PUBE].
157
See Rodolphe Barrangou, CRISPR Provides Acquired Resistance Against Viruses in
Prokaryotes, 315 SCIENCE 1709 (2007).
158
See Lanphier, supra note 156.
159
See David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos,
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modifyhuman-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/7NJM-DZA4].
160
See id. (noting concerns about “inheritable genetic modifcation[s].”).
161
See id. (explaining that “genome editing in human embryos using current technologies could
have unpredictable effects on future generations.”).
162
See id. (“Researchers have also expressed concerns that any gene-editing research on human
embryos could be a slippery slope towards unsafe or unethical uses of the technique.”). Though the idea
with editing germ cells is to reduce risk of cancer or handicaps, this could lead to people who are less
accepting of people with disabilities in society. Creating these “designer babies” could create a rift
between those able to afford CRISPR modification and those who cannot. Furthermore, eliminating
strands of DNA we know may cause cancer may have untold consequences when a person reproduces.
There is no way for certain to verify that these untold consequences will not come to light without
human reproduction.
163
See Lanphier, supra note 156.
164
See id.
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research on a large scale. The lure of a high impact human germline editing
paper would be enough for some scientists to override this voluntary
cessation of research.165 Thus, the journal editors and funding agencies must
also disincentivize human germline modification for this to have a large
impact.
In 2015, Chinese researchers led by Junjiu Huang edited the genome
of human embryos.166 Huang recognized the potential ethical concerns with
his research and used “non-viable embryos . . . obtained from fertility
clinics” to modify a human gene.167 Though the embryos could not produce
a live birth if implanted into a human through in vitro fertilization,
scientists and journals worldwide recognized that experiments on human
embryos—viable or not—is ethically questionable.168
Nature and Science, two of the highest impact scientific journals in the
world, rejected the paper and refused to publish the results.169 Huang
explained that the rejection was based, in part, on ethical objections.170
Though the results were published in a Beijing-based journal, Protein &
Cell, a refusal of publication from Nature and Science will dissuade other
scientists from pursuing research on human embryos regardless of ethical
concerns.171 Protein & Cell, an online journal with an impact factor of
3.817 cannot compare in prestige to Nature and Science.172 The perception
of paper quality in journals with low impact factors is, in turn, lower than
papers published in high impact journals. As a result of subject matter
rejection from top science journals, other scientists are dissuaded from
pursuing or continuing human embryo gene editing studies – at least for the
time being.
165

See, e.g., Richard Gray, Surgeon Behind World’s First Human Head Transplant Says the
Operation Could Take Place in the UK Next Year, DAILYMAIL.COM (Nov. 23, 2016, 12:21PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3949888/Controversial-surgeon-world-s-human-HEADtransplant-reveals-virtual-reality-help-prepare-patients.html [https://perma.cc/FF26-UCAQ] (explaining
that there is a neurosurgeon who will attempt to transplant a human head, but scientists are skeptical, in
part, because the experiments the neurosurgeon has performed so far are not proven to work for
humans. The journals cited are not peer-reviewed and are not evidence-based publications).
166
See Puping Liang, et al., CRISPR/Cas9-mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear
Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN CELL 363 (2015).
167
David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos,
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modifyhuman-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/T7ZE-YY5M] (modifying a human gene to prevent a
potentially fatal blood disorder).
168
See id.
169
See id. (“Huang says the paper was rejected by Nature and Science”).
170
See id.
171
See Liang, supra note 166.
172
See Impact Factor of Protein & Cell, BIOXBIO, (2016) www.bioxbio.com/if/html/PROTEINCELL.html [https://perma.cc/7QF9-3Y2J].

60

15:35 (2017)

Patenting Frankenstein’s Monster

Furthermore, funding organizations, including the National Institute of
Health (NIH) are refusing to fund gene editing studies of human
embryos.173 Days after Huang’s paper was published in Protein & Cell, the
NIH released a statement entitled “Statement on NIH funding of research
using gene-editing technologies in human embryos.”174 Though the NIH
recognized that gene editing can be used to improve scientific
“understanding of gene function and advance potential therapeutic
applications to correct genetic abnormalities,” the NIH will categorically
refuse funding gene-editing technologies in human embryos.175 The NIH
explained that altering the human germline has been debated over many
years and the scientific community has reached an almost universal
consensus that altering the human germline is “a line that should not be
crossed.”176 Cited factors included safety issues, ethical issues about
affecting future generations of humans without their consent, and “lack of
compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in
embryos.”177 Without funding from the NIH, many laboratories will simply
lack the ability to perform scientific studies and, thus, will lose yet another
incentive to experiment on human embryos.178
The scientific community does not just recognize the need to
disincentivize an artificial or mutated human by means of embryo
modifications. In recent years, an Italian neurosurgeon named Dr. Sergio
Canavero has spoken about performing “the first human head transplant” in
2017, pending “ethical approval and the funding to do it.”179 However,
many scientists have argued against pursuing such experiments, explaining

173

Francis S. Collins, Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-editing Technologies in
Human Embryos, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.nih.gov/aboutnih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-nih-funding-research-using-gene-editingtechnologies-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/JWP5-2NPZ] (“NIH will not fund any use of geneediting technologies in human embryos.”).
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
See id. (“These include the serious and unquantifiable safety issues, ethical issues presented by
altering the germline in a way that affects the next generation without their consent, and a current lack
of compelling medical applications justifying the use of CRISPR/Cas9 in embryos.”).
178
But see Bob Grant, Follow the Funding, THE SCIENTIST (May 1, 2015), http://www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/42799/title/Follow-the-Funding/ [https://perma.cc/PKK9-LL5Y]
(showing that scientists will adapt to fund their laboratories, rather than assume their experiments will
eventually be funded).
179
See Prakash Chandra, Meet Sergio Canavero, the Neurosurgeon Who Will Carry Out First
Human Head Transplant Next Year, ECONOMIC TIMES PANACHE (May 14, 2016),
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/magazines/panache/meet-sergio-canavero-the-neurosurgeon-whowill-carry-out-first-human-head-transplant-next-year/articleshow/52263142.cms
[https://perma.cc
/VUP2-9FLH].
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the ethical costs far outweigh the scientific benefits.180 Furthermore, many
explain that Dr. Canavero’s experiment “has been mostly about publicity
rather than the production of good science.”181 Papers concerning Dr.
Canavero’s research are being published in journals which are guest-edited,
rather than peer-edited.182 Without being published in a peer-reviewed
journal, meaning a journal where other neuroscientists and researchers
would examine Canavero’s results, these experiments are merely “science
through public relations.”183 The lack of peer reviewed journal publications
casts doubt on the veracity of Dr. Canavero’s results and, potentially, the
source of future funding of his experiments.184 The ethical outcry by both
journal publications and by individual scientists seems to be slowing the
progress on Dr. Canavero’s endeavors.185
Through the examples of CRISPR human embryo editing and head
transplantation, the scientific community has demonstrated two facts:
science is progressing towards artificially creating humans and the
scientific community is attempting to stop progress of questionably ethical
human experimentation. By removing incentives of funding and journal
publication, it has become harder for scientists to progress in experiments
related to human genetic modification. United States law, and patent law in
particular, must become more transparent before it can have the same effect
of deterring experimentation in this space.186 To effectively dissuade
creation of a human organism, the term “human organism” must become
better defined under current United States law and in the United States
patent system.

180

See, e.g., Anto Cartolovni & Antonio G. Spagnolo, Ethical Considerations Regarding Head
Transplantation, 6 SURG. NEUROL. INT. 103 (2015) (explaining that the patient “will be exposed to far
greater and unknown risks than the benefits of the procedure.” These include immunosuppressive drugs,
genetic inheritance, and using organs that “could be useful to someone else that needs a heart or liver
that could save his/her life.”).
181
See Sam Wong, Head Transplant Carried Out on Monkey, Claims Maverick Surgeon, NEW
SCIENTIST (Jan. 19, 2016) (quoting Thomas Cochrane, a neurologist at Harvard Medical School’s
Center for Bioethics), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2073923-head-transplant-carried-out-onmonkey-claims-maverick-surgeon/ [https://perma.cc/9GJH-H5GD].
182
See id. (explaining that the research has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal).
183
Id.
184
See id.
185
See id. (as of 2017, Canavero has not been granted funding or approval for the proposed
experimental surgery).
186
The ambiguity of “human organism” in Section 33(a) requires clarification before examiner and
USPTO rejections can be truly effective against an inventor attempting to patent artificial human
products.
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B. Products of Life: The Current Problems with Patenting Artificial
Tissues
The divide between necessary scientific research and potentially
unethical experimentation comes to a crux with artificial copying of human
organisms. Though the patent system strives to incentivize research, it
often falls short of fully supporting biotechnology. Due to ambiguous
language, conflicting legislation, and unclear court opinions, research
attempting to mimic nature cannot be properly promoted within the current
confines of the patent system.
Under the current patent system, scientists can obtain patents for
artificial tissues, even those comprising human cells.187 These tissues are
considered patentable for one main reason: the artificial tissues are
different than naturally occurring tissues.188 Scientists are in the process of
developing artificial tissues and artificial organs.189 These organs are
eventually meant to be compatible with human organs.190 That is, natural
organ donations may eventually become a thing of the past. The object of
many of these research projects is to create organs for those on organ
donation waiting lists.191 The problem lies in this progression: scientists are
working to replicate a natural product. The closer scientists get to
replication of a natural product, the further scientists get to patent
protection of their invention.
187

See, e.g., U.S. Patent App. No. 14/153,535 at 4 (Notice of Allowance issued Sept. 27, 2016)
(claiming in Claim 4 “an artificial tissue construct . . . comprising alveolar primary epithelial cells . . .
wherein the alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . are human cells.”).
188
See Yasuhiko Tabata, Biomaterial Technology for Tissue Engineering Applications, 6 J. OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY INTERFACE S311, S314 (2009) (comparing natural and synthetic biomaterials used in
tissue engineering-based regeneration therapy); Yalda A.Kharaz, et al., Proteomic Differences Between
Native and Tissue-engineered Tendon and Ligament, 16 PROTEOMICS 1547, 1550-1552 (Apr. 8, 2016)
(discussing the differences between engineered and natural tissues).
189
See, e.g., Anthony Atala, Tissue Engineering of Artificial Organs, 14 J. OF ENDOUROLOGY 49,
49-51 (2009) (discussing tissue engineering efforts for tissue and organs within the urinary system); see
also U.S. Patent No. 5,750,329 (issued May 12, 1998) (patenting methods and compositions for an
artificial lung organ culture system).
190
See id. (“Trials of urethral tissue replacement with processed collagen matrices are in progress,
and bladder replacement using tissue engineering techniques are currently being arranged. Recent
progress suggests that engineered urologic tissues may have clinical applicability in the future.”); see
also Alexandra Ossola, Scientists Grow Full-sized, Beating Human Hearts from Stem Cells POPULAR
SCIENCE (Mar. 16, 2016) http://www.popsci.com/scientists-grow-transplantable-hearts-with-stem-cells
(showing that growing artificial organs will combat organ shortage problems).
191
See The Surprising Future of Artificial Organ Transplants, Brandvoice, FORBES (Sept. 26,
2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oppenheimerfunds/2016/09/26/the-surprising-future-ofartificial-organ-transplants/#af9323f43963 [https://perma.cc/BGA4-YNSW] (providing an overview of
artificial organ research done thus far and explaining that “[s]cientists are finding newer, cheaper and
safer pathways to create artificial organs — pathways that could reduce the wait for organ transplants
and transform surgery as we know it.”).
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As explained above, according to 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 102, if a
product or process already exists in nature, it cannot later be patented.192 If
scientists are able to create exact replicas of organs or human tissues, their
inventions are not patentable under current law.193 The process to create the
artificial tissue could be patentable, but the actual product may not be. The
more similar the artificial organ is to a real organ, the less likely the
invention would be patentable.194 The distinction between patentable and
not patentable artificial tissue replication becomes murkier every day. With
the addition of Section 33(a), the USPTO can impose additional hurdles to
biotechnology inventors.195
Currently, the USPTO has not rejected many current patents based on
Section 33(a).196 However, the file history of US 8,821,541 shows that
Section 33(a)—not § 102—can be used to prevent the patentability of
tissues.197 In the file history of ‘541, the inventor patented an apparatus for
anchoring a surgical suture to a bone.198 During the examination of the
192

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015).
See id. (showing that, if something already exists in nature before an inventor applies for a
patent, the material is not patentable; see also Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
194
See Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2118 (showing that isolated and purified DNA is not
patent-eligible, even with laboratory intervention).
195
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011) (reading
in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no patent may issue on a claim
directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Without properly defining the term “human
organism,” but showing that this is a necessary amendment to patent laws and, specifically 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 laws, the difference between “human organism” and a “product of nature” is unclear and can be
an additional barrier to patent applicants outside of typical § 101 law.).
196
This was first searched through “Harvard Dataverse,” providing a compilation of all rejections
of patent applications until December 11, 2015. See Michael Frakes & Melissa Wasserman, Replication
Data For: Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid
Patents? Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, HARVARD DATAVERSE (2015),
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ABE7VS [https://perma.cc
/D2RB-VAEQ]. After searching 200 randomized rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and finding nothing,
this was then searched through docketalarm.com, a search database, to determine if any post-grant
proceedings, including litigations, inter partes reviews, and post-grant reviews, were conducted on
patents rejected under Section 33(a). DOCKET ALARM, www.docketalarm.com (last visited Jan. 25,
2017). Out of the 77 search results, three post-grant proceedings were conducted on patents rejected
under Section 33(a). These are summarized as follows: US Patent App. No. 13/672,422 (filed Nov. 8,
2012) (Aug. 17, 2016 Final Rejection rejecting claims reciting the “neck of a user” under Section 33(a)
and suggesting an amendment reciting the term “adapted to the neck of a user” to ameliorate the
rejection); U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 (issued Sept. 2, 2014) (discussed below, notes 197-200); U.S.
Patent No. 7,454,002 (reissue U.S. App. No. 14/567,016 (filed Dec. 11, 2014)) (Apr. 12, 2016 NonFinal Rejection rejecting claim 30 reciting that a receiver “is coupled to the user” and, therefore,
positively claims the user). Only the U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 rejection remotely discusses patenting a
human organism. All other rejections amount to little more than draftsman errors.
197
U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 (issued Sept. 2, 2014).
198
See id. (patenting a “suture anchor with insert-molded rigid member”).
193
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application, the examiner rejected claim 34, which recited a suture anchor
“wherein at least one suture strand has a length sufficient to tie tissue.”199
The examiner stated “Claim 34 is positively claiming the tissue which is a
human organism” and, thus it is “excluded from the scope of patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”200 Regardless of the validity of the
examiner’s rejection, the statement that tissue is a human organism
demonstrates that Section 33(a) requires clarity.201 By allowing an examiner
to reject a claim to a tissue as a “human organism,” the uncertainty behind
the business of artificial organ creation grows larger.
Herein lies the problem with artificial tissue creation and, eventually,
artificial organ and organ system creation. If patent law were used to
incentivize creation of an artificial organ, the law should render the
artificial product patentable and not just the process of creating the organ.
However, patent law does not incentivize creating exact replicas of DNA or
animals that already exist in nature.202 If the object of creating an artificial
organ is to replicate one already found in nature, then, as science gets
closer and closer to the ultimate object, the products become less and less
likely to be patentable subject matter.203 Even if the product would be
different than what currently exists in nature, the definition of Section 33(a)
with regards to a human organism is so broad that, ultimately, no biomanufactured organ could be patentable.204
199

See Non-final Rejection of Application No. 11/518,872, 9 (non-final rejection issued Feb. 21,
2014) (Application of U.S. Patent No. 8,821,541 (issued Sept. 2, 2014)) (it should be noted that this
rejection was most likely directed to claim 33, not claim 34), as is evident from the patent file history).
200
See id. (showing that 33(a) is considered in the USPTO to be a subset of 35 U.S.C. § 101).
201
See id.; see also 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Weldon)
(citing a letter from James Rogan, Undersecretary and Director of the U.S. Patent Office, stating “Given
that the scope of Representative Weldon’s amendment [Section 33(a)] does not alter the USPTO policy
on the non-patentability of human life-forms at any stage of development and is fully consistent with
our policy, we support its enactment.”). If Section 33(a) was not meant to alter USPTO policy, then the
claims should have been otherwise allowable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because tissues, even those
comprising human cells are considered patentable. See, e.g., U.S. Patent App. No. 14/153,535 (Notice
of Allowance issued Sept. 27, 2016) (claiming in Claim 4 “an artificial tissue construct . . . comprising
alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . wherein the alveolar primary epithelial cells . . . are human cells.”).
202
See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1351
(2012) (explaining that “[T]here is no magic to a chemical bond that requires us to recognize a new
product when a chemical bond is created or broken.” This shows that, even if DNA or a tissue is created
synthetically in a laboratory, if it matches what already exists in nature, the synthetically created
biologic material is not patentable.).
203
See id. (showing that, the closer scientists get to replicating naturally occurring DNA, the harder
it would be to patent the product).
204
See Amanda H. Russo, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. and Its
Impact on the Patentability of “Designer” Genes, 4 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 37, 40 (2014)
(“Unfortunately, the AIA never expressly defines any of the terms in [33(a)] so it is not entirely clear
what specific subject matter would fall under the prohibition.”); Andrew Armstrong, 3D Printed Human
Organs and the Debate on Applicable Patent Law, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 7, 2015),
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C. Defining a “Human Organism”: An Exploration of the Term “Human”
in Other Areas of United States Law
To provide clarity to Section 33(a) and promote ethical
experimentation, there must be a clear, precise definition of “human
organism” that encompasses the legislative intent behind Section 33(a). To
produce such a definition, Congress can look to other areas of United States
law for template definitions of a human. Certainly, the Congressional
record behind the adoption of Section 33(a) unambiguously demonstrates
that the term “human organism” has a different meaning in patent law than
in other legal areas.205 Congressmen claim that human embryos fall under
the patent definition of “human organism.”206 However, under current
criminal law statutes, dropping a petri dish full of artificially inseminated
cells does not constitute murder of a human being. Nevertheless, because
patent law does not give a clear definition of “human organism,” other
areas of the law should be used for context and insight. Through looking to
laws concerning in vitro fertilization and brain-dead individuals, the
definition of “human organism” in patent law can be designed to
incentivize artificial organ development and discourage human
experimentation. Two main statutes can be used for guidance: 1 U.S.C. § 8
(defining a living human) and the Uniform Death Determination Act
(defining when a body ceases to be a living human).207
1 U.S.C. § 8 defines a “person” and “human being” as including
“every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any
stage of development.”208 It clarifies that “born alive . . . means the
complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother of that member, at
any stage of development, who after such expulsion or extraction breathes
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/10/07/3d-printed-human-organs-and-the-debate-on-applicable-patent
-law/id=62307/ [https://perma.cc/S5B6-BMZT] (explaining that using a definition for human organism,
“any living entity containing one or more cells belonging to the species homo sapiens” would render a
“bioprinted organ ineligible for patenting.”); see also 157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. June 23, 2011)
(statement of Rep. Smith) (“The term ‘human organism’ includes an organism of the human species
that incorporates one or more genes taken from a nonhuman organism . . . However, it does not include
non-human organism incorporating one or more genes taken from a human organism.”).
205
See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (defining “person” and “human being”); see also Cruzan by
Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990) (defining occurrence of human
death); Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf [https://perma.cc/7984-32PD].
206
157 CONG. REC. E1179 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith) (stating that a
human embryo is an “organism.”).
207
See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002); Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf. The Uniform
Determination of Death Act has been adopted by 41 states thus far. See, e.g. Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 63,
§ 3122 (West).
208
1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002).
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or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite
movement of voluntary muscles. . . .”209 This limits a human being to 1) a
homo sapien 2) who is born and 3) (who is born) alive.
In terms of end-of-life care in the United States, the Uniform
Determination of Death Act explains “An individual who has sustained
either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or
(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem, is dead.”210 In other words, if brain function stops, the body is
no longer alive. Medical professionals are legally allowed to withdraw life
support without criminal repercussions.211
The following chart provides a summary of the requirements to be
considered a human being under 1 U.S.C. § 8 and the requirements to be
considered dead under the Uniform Determination of Death Act.
1 U.S.C. § 8212

Uniform Determination of
Death Act213

Every infant member of the species
homo sapien . . . at any stage of
development
Complete expulsion or extraction
from his or her mother
Breathes OR has a beating heart,

Irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory
functions

Pulsation of the umbilical cord OR
Irreversible cessation of all
definite movement of voluntary
functions of all the entire brain
muscles
Chart 1: Topical Definitions of “Human” or “Living Human” in Other
Areas of United States Law
Through analyzing the legislative history of Section 33(a), the
definition of a human being in 1 U.S.C. § 8 cannot simultaneously be used
209

Id.
See Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf.; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 2017).
211
See Robert M. Sade, Brain Death, Cardiac Death, and the Dead Donor Rule, 107 J.S.C. MED.
ASS’N 146, 147 (2011) (“Although withdrawal of life support (not the patient’s disease) causes death, it
is not a legally or morally culpable act.”).
212
1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002).
213
Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf.; Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 63, § 3122 (West 2017).
210
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for the term “human organism.” The terms “born” and “alive” were simply
not contemplated definitional aspects of “human organism” as construed in
patent law.214
Because “no member of the human species is an ‘invention’ or
property to be licensed for financial gain,” Congress intended the term
“human organism” to encompass human embryos.215 Human embryos are
not born and are not alive. They have not been expelled or extracted from a
mother. Furthermore, even if a human embryo was implanted into a uterus
and developed until just before the embryo formed a fetus, it is not possible
for the most developed human embryo to be extracted from the uterus
alive.216 The embryo, as extracted, would not breathe, have a beating heart,
pulsation of the umbilical cord, or movement of voluntary muscles.217
Section 33(a) was adopted to “not allow . . . researchers to gain
financially by granting them an exclusive right to practice . . . ghoulish
research,” such as creating male-female hybrid embryos.218 Cellular
research certainly goes beyond what is contemplated as human under 1
U.S.C. § 8.219 Scientists who are experimenting are not murdering or
battering embryos. Scientists cannot be prosecuted for murder when
experimenting with fertilized embryos.220 In fact, scientists can let fertilized

214

See 157 CONG. REC. E1177 – E1180 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (demonstrating through absence
that congressmen debating Section 33(a) did not discuss when a human organism was born or when a
human organism was considered alive).
215
See id. at E1177.
216
See KEITH L MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, ESSENTIALS OF EMBRYOLOGY AND BIRTH DEFECTS, 6
(7th ed. 2008) (explaining that at the end of the embryonic period at eight weeks, “the beginnings . . . of
all essential structures are present.” However, fetuses are not viable until “22 weeks after fertilization,
but the chance of survival is not good until the fetus is several weeks older.”).
217
See id. at 2, 191-194, 245 (explaining that the embryonic period ends at week eight of
pregnancy; the embryo develops heart tubes and umbilical arteries but not a fully developed heart;
showing the progression of the musculoskeletal system of the embryo – none of these are functional
outside of the womb); Pregnancy Timeline, BBC News (Dec. 23, 2004, 13:42 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4121411.stm [https://perma.cc/9F3R-DZYH] (showing a beginner’s
guide to fetal development and explaining that an embryo is a mass of cells before the second month of
pregnancy. That embryo develops into a fetus around the second month); M.A. Hill, Respiratory System
Development, EMBRYOLOGY (Jan. 23, 2017), https://embryology.med.unsw.edu.au/embryology
/index.php/Respiratory_System_Development [https://perma.cc/P7R9-HP96] (explaining that though
lungs begin to form as an embryo, by the time the embryo develops into a fetus, these lungs are buds,
“an outgrowth from the ventral wall of the foregut” and are not functional).
218
157 CONG. REC. E1178 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
219
1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (discussing the definition of a human after birth, but not discussing
development of a human in utero or by synthetic means).
220
But see Ann A. Kiessling, What Is an Embryo?: A Rejoinder, 37 CONN. L. REV. *1, *8 (2004)
(showing that this issue is contested, arguing “that if embryos have the moral status of persons born,
then destroying them for any reason is murder” (referencing Harold T. Shapiro, What Is an Embryo?: A
Comment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2004))).
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embryos expire without any criminal ramifications.221 The same cannot be
said for humans. A scientist cannot poke or prod another human with a
needle, nor can a scientist ignore another human until he or she expires.222
Therefore, the definition of “human organism” under the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act Section 33(a) must be broader than the definition of
“person” and “human being” under 1 U.S.C. § 8.
Nothing grown in a lab will ever be considered “born,” unless
scientists determine that an artificial uterus is the best way to develop
cells.223 However, this seems unlikely as it would go against the years of
progress in cell growth experiments, which currently use scaffolds and
molds to shape and form artificially grown tissues.224 Therefore, there must
be a way to distinguish “human organisms” without requiring birth in a
patent context. The current problem is the uncertainty behind this
distinction. Looking to end-of-life definitions under United States law
helps to provide a bit of clarity between the definition of a human and the
potential definition of a “human organism.”
The Uniform Determination of Death Act provides a far better
template to create a working definition of human organism under Section
33(a). If the definition of death were applied in reverse, meaning that
nothing became “alive” until it fulfilled the criteria listed under the Act,
Congress could promote experimentation with artificial organs while still
preserving the legislative intent to discourage human embryonic
experiments. This would have the added benefit of avoiding the
complicated viability arguments entangling abortion.225
221

Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. CIV. A. 95-5827, 2002 WL 1288784, at *4–5
(R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002) (explaining that frozen embryos were not considered “‘persons’ for
constitutional purposes” (quoting Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998))); see also Amber N.
Dina, Wrongful Death and the Legal Status of the Previable Embryo: Why Illinois is on the Cutting
Edge of Determining a Definitive Standard for Embryonic Legal Rights, 19 REGENT. U.L. REV. 251,
264–66 (2006) (discussing the possibility of civil penalties for an embryo bank for wrongfully
destroying embryos without permission).
222
See First Oak Brook Corp. Syndicate v. Comly Holding Corp., 93 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1996)
(defining battery as “harmful or offensive contact between or among two or more persons”); see also S.
John Campanie, 1989 N.Y. Op. Att’y Gen. (Inf.) 98 (1989) (defining “[a] death caused by unlawful act
or criminal neglect” as a death that a coroner can investigate).
223
See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (defining a human as ‘born alive’ as “the complete expulsion or
extraction from his or her mother.”).
224
See Dietmar W. Hutmacher, Scaffolds in Tissue Engineering Bone and Cartilage, 21
BIOMATERIALS 2529 (2000) (explaining the use of scaffold designs to artificially design
musculoskeletal tissue, bone, and cartilage).
225
See Yaniv Heled, On Patenting Human Organisms or How the Abortion Wars Feed into the
Ownership Fallacy, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 241, 256 (2014) (explaining that “the mingling of sex,
embryo research, and the context of the abortion debate generated sufficient outrage to persuade
Congress to reenact the Weldon Amendment[Section 33(a)] time and again until it finally found a
permanent home in Section 33 of the America Invents Act”); see also 157 CONG. REC. E1178–E1181
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The first requirement of the Uniform Determination of Death Act is
“irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”226 Applying
this definition of life, unlike the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 8, to an embryo
does not specifically require a heart or lungs.227 Though an embryo may
possess the beginnings of a circulatory and respiratory system, an embryo
does not have a functional heart or lungs at the end of its development
process.228 Therefore, a template definition of a “human organism”
requiring “circulatory and respiratory functions” would unquestionably
apply to an embryo.229 Additionally, it would exclude artificial organ
development, except experiments creating a combination of a
cardiovascular and respiratory system.230
Furthermore, by the end of the embryonic period and the beginning of
the fetal development period, “rudimentary structures of the brain and
central nervous system are established.”231 Therefore, the second prong of
the Uniform Determination of Death Act could be fulfilled by a human.232
Artificial tissues do not have a brain or central nervous system.233 Until
scientists develop an artificial brain, artificial respiratory system, or
artificial circulatory system that can be implanted into a human, no
definition of “alive” could overshadow scientific research and deny
research facilities well-deserved patents. The individual organ systems
would be patentable under this definition, but the human body receiving the

(daily ed. June 23, 2011) (discussing that embryos are not patentable and showing that viability of an
embryo does not play into the definition of a “human organism” for patent subject matter purposes).
226
See Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf.
227
See 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2002) (requiring a “person” or “human being” to have a beating heart or
breathe).
228
See Keith L Moore & T.V.N. Persaud, Essentials of Embryology and Birth Defects, 191–94 (7th
ed. 2008) explaining that the embryonic period ends at week eight of pregnancy; the embryo develops
heart tubes and umbilical arteries but not a fully developed heart).
229
See id. (showing that, though embryos do not have viably formed hearts or lungs, embryos do
develop circulatory and respiratory functions).
230
If scientists artificially developed a working cardiovascular and respiratory system, connected
these systems, and attached this system to a brain, the overall combination of systems may not be
patentable subject matter under Section 33(a) if the definition of “human organism” used the template
of the Uniform Determination of Death Act. This development, however, is far from where science has
progressed in the present state.
231
See Joan Stiles & Terry L. Jernigan, The Basics of Brain Development, 20 NEUROPSYCHOL.
REV. 327, 328 (2010).
232
See Uniform Determination of Death Act (1981), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/determination%20of%20death/udda80.pdf (requiring “irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.” If this were to be interpreted broadly, any
organism with human central nervous system development could be construed to fall under the
definition of “human organism.”).
233
Unless the artificial tissues in question are brain tissues or nervous system tissues.

70

15:35 (2017)

Patenting Frankenstein’s Monster

implant would still remain unpatentable, as the combination of functioning
organ systems would fulfill the definitional basis of a “human organism”.
Adopting informed definitions of “human organism” from the realm of
end-of-life care rather than from “beginning of life” definitions would help
to clarify patentability in biotechnology.234
The objective of patent law is to incentivize innovation.235 To
incentivize innovation, particularly in the high-cost world of
biotechnology, those funding the industry should be able to predict whether
an eventual product or method, if successful, would become profitable.236
This profit can be derived from a patent—the ability to exclude others from
making or using the new product or method.237 With this ability can come
lucrative licensing deals, which can be used to fund future research and
development.238 With ambiguity in the law come uncertain investors: would
investing in artificial organ development be investing in unpatentable
technology? Through clarifying the term “human organism” by exploring
both the above definitions of human life and the scientific objectives and
concerns regarding artificial human development, discussed below,
artificial tissue development can be investigated while hindering unethical
experimentation on humans and fetuses.
V. INCENTIVIZING RESEARCH: DEFINING A “HUMAN ORGANISM” WITH A
LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC LENS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE TERM “HUMAN”
IN OTHER AREAS OF UNITED STATES LAW
This section addresses policy concerns of both scientists and
legislators in tissue engineering patents. To promote innovation, legislators
must adopt a clear and strong patent system. This includes allowing
businesses to obtain patents that will clearly stand in a court of law. To
clarify the murky subject matter concerns in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and Section
234

At least for the definition of “human organism” as used in Section 33(a) for patentability
purposes.
235
See Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. St.-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 647 F.3d 1373,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“At its heart, the patent system incentivizes improvements to patented
technology.”).
236
See Cal. Inst. of Tech. v. Hughes Commc’ns Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 974, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“In
order to best incentivize innovation, however, patent law must be predictable, consistent, and
uniform.”).
237
See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law - Balancing Profit Maximization and Public Access
to Technology, 4 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (explaining that patent rights are “used by
an enterprise to make a profit.”).
238
See, e.g., Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Intel Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 898, 903 (W.D. Wis.
2009) (explaining that research at the university is supported “by patenting and licensing university
inventions and by returning the proceeds of that licensing to fund additional research at the
university.”).
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33(a) that have emerged in the past decade, scientists and legislators must
collectively arrive at a consensus to properly define “human organism” to
promote ethical experimentation in biotechnical organ engineering.
At a recent international conference discussing the future of lifepatenting, Dr. Calum MacKellar asked whether Dr. Frankenstein should
have been permitted to patent his creation.239 Congress has answered this
question with a resounding . . . maybe. As explained during the adoption of
Section 33(a), “no member of the human species is an invention.”240 Human
beings are not meant to be “property to be licensed for financial gain.”241
The object of Section 33(a) was to disincentivize the commodification of
human life and to not allow “profiteers to financially gain from the biology
and life of another human person.”242 With the ever-blurring line between
man and man-made man—from in vitro fertilization to the creation of
artificial organs—the question of the patentability of Frankenstein’s
monster has become only more obscure.
Though the intention behind Section 33(a) was to prevent patenting of
a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism, there is no law that
clarified the definition of “directed to” or “human organism.”243 Through
examining the legislative history behind Section 33(a), two facts become
abundantly clear: 1) legislators did not want embryos to become patentable
and 2) legislators did not contemplate the effects Section 33(a) could have
on human tissue engineering.244 With the increasingly murky judicial
rulings behind 35 U.S.C. § 101, the lack of clear definitions for Section
33(a) will slow the development of artificial tissues and artificial organs.245

239

See Rob Vischer, Patents on Life: The Future of Life-Patenting, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Sept. 5,
2015),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/09/patents-on-life-the-future-of-lifepatenting.html (referencing the International Conference for Patents on Life: Through the Lenses of
Law, Religious Faith, and Social Justice, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE (Sept. 4-5, 2015), available at
http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/events/past-events/conferences/patents-conference-2015).
240
157 CONG. REC. E1177 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith).
241
Id.
242
See id.
243
See id. at E1178 (“Even the European Union prevents patents on human embryos.”).
244
See id. at E1178-E1181 (discussing that embryos are not patentable, while failing to discuss
“human organs” or “tissues”).
245
See Ryan Davis, Patent Eligibility Confusion Reigns Post-Alice, Experts Say, LAW360 (Mar.
26, 2015, 7:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/636273/patent-eligibility-confusion-reigns-postalice-experts-say [https://perma.cc/73BG-6CTF] (showing that the Court did not clarify patentable
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Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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Though some economists may find that patents do not promote
innovation in all fields of research, patents do provide clear incentives to
innovate in the field of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.246 “[T]he
existence and strength of the patent system affects the organization of
industry.”247 A working patent system requires clear laws and strong patents
to function.248 A patent is worth the investment only if it can stand up in
court.249 With unclear laws regarding the patentability of subject matter
changing quickly and without direction in the last decade, investments in
patentable biotechnology could be on the verge of decline.250
To hedge this possibility, legislators must clarify the law with regard
to patentable technology. Most specifically, if the law is to truly prevent
unethical experimentation and simultaneously fulfill the Constitutional
requirement to “Promote the Progress of Science”, the definition of human
organism must be clarified.251 No court has issued a ruling construing
Section 33(a).252 Legislators should develop a further unambiguous record
before the history of Section 33(a) becomes too convoluted to cleanly
clarify.
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for all to use, businesses with the means to sue will sue. A business would not obtain a patent if it was
too easy to invalidate because it would not be worth the original investment if no entity licenses the
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[https://perma.cc/2Z6A-NSWL]
(showing that the Supreme Court “declined to articulate a definitive test” for the subject matter
patentability of software and “intellectual property practitioners and technology companies [were]
anxiously awaiting clarification” on the subject); Richard Baker, Where Do We Stand One Year After
Alice, Law360 (June 17, 2015, 8:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/668773/where-do-we-standone-year-after-alice [https://perma.cc/CM2M-RYA8] (explaining that the “secondary market for
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Now is the time to act. The category of human organism is
hybridizing. Far from an artificial hip replacement or in vitro fertilization,
the biotechnological improvements are expanding into what was originally
considered pure science fantasy: the creation of a human. Experiments in
implantable tissues and artificial organs are underway.253 Future
experiments in human tissue transplanting could go beyond life-saving
procedures, with new procedures being developed to make stronger bones
and better muscles.254 If these go further than simple organ transplantation,
stepping into the world of human improvements, the line between human
organism and human engineered devices will become even vaguer with
time.
If the goal of patent law is truly to promote innovation, the patent law
space must prioritize unambiguous legislative text. In the past decade,
multiple Court rulings in subject matter patent law have left the scientific
community wanting.255 In fact, patent law is recognized to be such a
difficult and tedious matter for judges to decide uniformly that a patent
pilot program has been established to help judges specialize. Though courts
may create a definition of “human organism” under 33(a) based on
legislative history, the job is best left up to the legislature and scientists.
Promoting science with patents can only go so far without the
assistance of the science community. The goal to promote science without
incentivizing unethical experimentation necessitates input from scientists.
Luckily, commentary with regard to moral issues behind developing an
artificial human or experimenting on human embryos goes far beyond the
legal realm. Scientists are trying to prevent unethical experimentation in
gene-editing and transplant methodologies.256 Their efforts, however, can
only go so far without legal backing. If patents are enough to incentivize
scientists to break with moral impositions in their field, then the United
States patent law will be undermining scientific efforts.
Science cannot succeed devoid of law. Nor can law be devoid of
science. For too long, legislative history and judicial precedent have been
created in the patent world without a true understanding of the implications
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and the science affected by those policies.257 If the goal of defining a
“human organism” is to dissuade scientists from experimenting on human
embryos, the true definition of an embryo should be incorporated into the
law. Instead of shying away from defining before-birth and after-birth
fetuses and humans due to a complicated moral and theological system, the
complexities of life should be embraced by the legal and scientific
communities.258
Isolating law from science cannot be the policy of the patent system.
To ameliorate concerns about creating an unclear definition of “human
organism” under Section 33(a), a committee should form with scientists,
ethicists, and lawmakers to assess the current state of patent law in
biotechnology. Together this committee can work toward finding an
acceptable definition of “human organism” that neither hinders scientific
exploration nor promotes unethical procedures.
This definition should use the template provided by the Uniform
Determination of Death Act, wherein a “human organism” would need to
have either both circulatory and respiratory functions or functional central
nervous system.259 If the mutual goal of the scientific and legal
communities is to discourage experimentation upon fertilization of an egg,
but encourage experimentation in artificial tissue engineering, the
definition of a “human organism” cannot be informed by the definition of a
human being.260 Rather, this definition must be informed by a negative: a
definition of something possessing human tissue, but not possessing the
essential qualities of life. The Uniform Determination of Death Act
provides this very template by explaining when life stops.261 Defining
“human organism” using the Uniform Determination of Death Act template
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would encompass human embryos, but would not hinder experimentation
with regard to artificial tissues and organs.262
Through providing this clear definition, progress in bioengineering
can advance unhindered by future ambiguous legislative and judicial
actions. The definition could clarify the murky laws of patentable subject
matter for scientists and lawmakers alike. Bringing both certainty and
transparency to patent law can better inform both scientists and businesses.
This can help push research toward ethical progress in the field of organ
transplantation. A committee including both scientists and legislators has
the most potential to form a cohesive, unambiguous definition of “human
organism” under Section 33(a). Together, this committee would promote
scientific progress in biotechnology and prevent the patentability of the
ultimate ethical concern: Frankenstein’s monster.
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